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ABSTRACT
Secure Device Pairing (SDP) relies on an out-of-band channel to
authenticate devices. This requires a common hardware interface,
which limits the use of existing SDP systems. We propose to use
short-range acoustic communication for the initial pairing. Audio
hardware is commonly available on existing off-the-shelf devices
and can be accessed from user space without requiring firmware
or hardware modifications.
We improve upon previous approaches by designing Acoustic
Integrity Codes (AICs): a modulation scheme that provides message
authentication on the acoustic physical layer. We analyze their
security and demonstrate that we can defend against signal cancel-
lation attacks by designing signals with low autocorrelation. Our
system can detect overshadowing attacks using a ternary decision
function with a threshold. In our evaluation of this SDP scheme’s
security and robustness, we achieve a bit error ratio below 0.1%
for a net bit rate of 100 bps with a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of
14 dB. Using our open-source proof-of-concept implementation on
Android smartphones, we demonstrate pairing between different
smartphone models.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Authentication; Mobile and wire-
less security; Security protocols; Key management; • Networks
→ Mobile networks; Wireless access networks; Cyber-physical
networks; • Hardware→ Digital signal processing.
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1 INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of ubiquitous computing devices require
secure provisioning and pairing mechanisms. During the setup of
cyber-physical systems, consumers still struggle with construct-
ing secure communication channels, as those require preexisting
security contexts, e.g. shared public keys when using asymmetric
cryptography. Establishing such a prior security context is a critical
step to ensure the communication’s security.
One way of establishing a new security context is SDP. The
devices pair in an ad-hoc manner and establish an authenticated key.
In contrast to public key infrastructures (e.g., x.509 or OpenPGP),
SDP does not require any trusted third parties, where Alice has to
trust other entities that help her initialize a security context with
Bob. Therefore, SDP is well-suited for offline and private scenarios,
emergency settings, or bootstrapping new deployments that are
not part of any public key infrastructure. There is growing research
in using physical device proximity to support SDP, by either using
a location-limited communication channel or extracting keys from
measuring the environment [16].
SDP requires a common hardware interface that both devices use
for pairing, which limits the applicability of existing SDP schemes.
Many SDP schemes use displays, cameras, vibration motors, ac-
celerometers, infrared transducers, or wireless near-field commu-
nication [7, 16]. A commonly available hardware interface that
is rarely used for SDP in practice is audio via speakers and mi-
crophones. Acoustic communication requires only minimal user
interaction, which increases usability and reduces potential failure
points. In contrast to electromagnetic wireless communication such
as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, acoustic communication requires no com-
plex network configuration and can be implemented as user space
software, even with physical-layer capabilities. This allows us to
perform acoustic communication on existing off-the-shelf devices
without hardware modification, reducing deployment costs [20].
Previous approaches that used audio for SDP, such as “HA-
PADEP” [39], require a manual verification phase for security rea-
sons, which is error-prone and reduces usability. We design a secure
acoustic communication protocol that requires less security-critical
user interaction by incorporating the recent research direction of
physical-layer security. These techniques consider security at the
lowest layer using the physical properties of the wireless radio
channel. Specifically, we use Integrity Codes, which were proposed
by Čapkun et al. to provide message integrity in the presence of
active attackers on the radio channel [3]. Using Integrity Codes, we
eliminate the need for a separate verification step, which speeds
up the pairing process and increases usability. Integrity Codes can
be vulnerable to signal cancellation attacks [8, 15, 26]. We therefore
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analyze this threat and propose countermeasures. Our resulting
design improves Integrity Codes by mitigating signal cancellation
attacks.
Our main contribution is the design, implementation and eval-
uation of Acoustic Integrity Codes (AICs), which we use for SDP.
This work combines the independent research fields of SDP, acous-
tic communication, and physical-layer security. To the best of our
knowledge, Integrity Codes have not been applied to acoustic com-
munication before. Our individual contributions are:
• Analysis of Signal Cancellation Attacks.We show that
signal cancellation attacks fail for signals with low autocorre-
lation. We propose system parameters that improve Integrity
Codes.
• Design of Acoustic Integrity Codes. We use Integrity
Codes to secure acoustic communication.
• Evaluation. We evaluate the security and robustness of
AICs using simulations.
• Design of an SDP scheme using AICs.We apply AICs to
design an acoustic SDP scheme.
• Implementation of a prototype for modern Android
devices. We implement an open-source proof-of-concept
for Android smartphones.
Our work is structured as follows: After introducing related work
and Integrity Codes in section 2, we present our design in section 3
and our implementation in section 4. Then, we analyze the security
of AICs in section 5 and evaluate them in section 6. Finally, we
conclude our work in section 7.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we describe SDP and present related work using
acoustic communication to perform SDP. We also introduce In-
tegrity Codes.
2.1 Secure Device Pairing
SDP enables multiple devices with no prior security context to es-
tablish a secure communication channel over an untrusted channel.
We only consider two devices A and B belonging to Alice and Bob,
respectively. The devices want to communicate over an a priori
insecure communication channel. They use an out-of-band (OOB)
channel to authenticate a key exchange, which they can then use
to construct a secure communication channel using a standard
cryptographic protocol such as Transport Layer Security (TLS).
The audio channel can be used as a location-limited channel to
perform this key exchange [1]. Goodrich et al. [10, 11] developed an
SDP system called “Loud&Clear”, which requires the user to detect
whether two computer-generated speech sequences are identical.
Soriente et al. [39] presented “HAPADEP”, in which the devices
encode their public keys as short audible melodies that the other
device can decode. They use a second verification phase to detect
machine-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, which requires active user
participation. Halperin et al. [13] developed an SDP system called
“Zero-Power Sensible Key Exchange” involving acoustic communi-
cation for implantable medical devices (IMDs). The IMD generates
a symmetric session key and transmits it as an audible sound wave
to the external device via a piezo element. This OOB channel has to
be secret, since their system lacks eavesdropping protection. Halevi
and Saxena [12] showed that eavesdropping is possible even with
off-the-shelf equipment, using digital signal processing. Claycomb
and Shin [4] devised an acoustic SDP method called “UbiSound”,
which uses a single unidirectional audio transmission. The user is
responsible for aborting the pairing process in case of malicious
interference. Mayrhofer et al. [21] presented “UACAP” as a gen-
eral SDP implementation that is designed to support multiple OOB
channels such as 2D barcodes, manual string comparison, and audio
(based on “HAPADEP”). Han et al. [14] proposed the SDP proto-
col “MVSec”, using either an audio or a visual channel as the OOB
channel to pair smartphones with cars. This pairing protocol hap-
pens mainly over an in-band Bluetooth channel. The audio channel
is used as the OOB channel to bidirectionally transfer truncated
commitments to the public keys.
In contrast to our design, these SDP schemes usually require
additional user interaction to defend against active attackers. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no publicly available acoustic
SDP implementation for current iOS or Android devices.
Apart from the audible sound spectrum, the inaudible ultrasound
spectrum has also been used as part of the secure pairing pro-
cess [18, 22, 23]. The ultrasound spectrum, however, is not suitable
to secure commercial off-the-shelf devices, because this requires
additional hardware. Apart from using acoustic communication di-
rectly, previous research on SDP also utilized the audio channel for
demonstrative identification [27], as part of an audiovisual pairing
scheme [29], or for ambient sensing [24, 32, 35].
2.2 Integrity Codes
Over the last decade, the research community has investigated
whether security goals such as authentication and integrity protec-
tion can be realized on the physical layer. As these physical-layer
security techniques usually do not assume a prior security context,
they are well-suited to protect SDP. In this section, we introduce
the Integrity Code physical-layer security primitive [3], which we
use to secure acoustic communication.
Čapkun et al. established the concept of Integrity Codes ("I-
Codes") [3], which is a modulation scheme that protects the mes-
sage integrity on the wireless physical layer without requiring any
shared key material. Instead, integrity and authentication can be
protected when the receiver knows that:
(1) the sender is currently transmitting and
(2) the sender is in the receiver’s range.
Figure 1 illustrates Integrity Codes. The transmitter first applies a
unidirectional error code (e.g., Manchester Code or Berger Code),
which can detect one direction of bit flips (from 0→ 1). Then, the
1푇푠 5푇푠 6푇푠 7푇푠 8푇푠
OOK
푥 (푡),
2푇푠 4푇푠3푇푠
푚(푡)
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
푡
Figure 1: Integrity Code signal representing the data 1011.
An attacker interferes using the red signal. This flips the
third bit from 0→ 1, which can be detected.
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transmitter performs on-off keying (OOK) using the encoded data.
OOK is a form of amplitude-shift keying (ASK), where a 0 is repre-
sented by the absence of a carrier wave and a 1 is represented by the
presence of a carrier wave. Instead of using a deterministic carrier
signal, however, we use a stochastic signal in each on slot. The idea
is that random signals cannot be cancelled by an active attacker via
destructive interference. An attacker is not able to change any bit
from 1 → 0. Any other modification of the message can be detected
at the receiver using unidirectional error codes. Integrity Codes
have been used to assist in SDP with radio communication [9, 36].
We use Integrity Codes to secure acoustic communication.
3 DESIGN
In this section, we present the design of our SDP scheme, which
uses short-range acoustic communication. We design AICs to se-
cure this communication on the physical layer. Our main goal is to
securely transmit public key material d (or shorter commitments
such as hash values) from Alice’s device A to Bob’s device B, even
in the presence of an active adversary Mallory, who tries to ma-
nipulate this communication using her devices Mn . We focus on
unidirectional SDP for the private and social application classes
and consider pairing in the other direction as an optional subse-
quent but separate step that works in the same way. The public key
material can then be used to initialize a security context between
the devices.
Specifically, our system shall achieve message authentication
of the transmitted public key material d , which consists of the
following two security properties [17, p. 25]:
• Identification of the sender: B is able to verify whether
the message d originated from A.
• Integrity: B can detect whether the message d was modified
during transmission. This is implied by the first property,
since then A would no longer be the message’s originator.
Confidentiality or availability protection is out of scope.
We use an acoustic channel as the physical channel, i.e., we
transmit information by modulating a mechanical pressure wave
generated by A using a speaker [7]. The receiver B records this
퐴 퐵
푆
푆푐
푥 (푡)
퐴퐵
푟푟
푚푂 (푡)
푀푂
푀푆퐶
푥 (푡) 푚푆퐶 (푡)
Figure 2: This system model shows a top-down perspective
of the devices A and B with the safe area S around them
(green). Possible adversaries can perform signal cancellation
attacks with device MSC (see subsection 5.1) or overshadow-
ing attacks with device MO (see subsection 5.3) in the inse-
cure area Sc (red) outside the secure area S .
using a microphone. Figure 2 shows the devices A and B and their
environment during the pairing process. We require that Alice
and Bob perform the pairing while being in proximity, such as by
standing next to each other. We denote the distance between the
devices A and B as AB. We denote the immediate area around Alice
and Bob as S , the safe area. The remaining unsafe area is Sc . We
model S using two spheres centered at A and B, respectively, with
radius r .
3.1 Assumptions
We assume that Alice and Bob control the safe area, i.e., there are no
malicious devices in S . We argue that this assumption is realistic for
the private application class such as when pairing devices at home.
For the social application class, this means that pairing should not
be performed in crowded areas, where an attacker could be close.
For the model parameters, we assume r > 40 cm > AB. These
parameters can be adjusted depending on the specific use case. We
study the security implications in section 5. We assume that device
A is equipped with a speaker and that device B is equipped with a
microphone. Microphones and speakers are commonly available on
commercial off-the-shelf devices. We assume that the devicesA and
B are not compromised, i.e., the software and hardware performing
the SDP scheme are not controlled by Mallory. Finally, we assume
thatA andB know the public protocol parameters, whichwe explain
in the next sections.
3.2 Adversary Model
Making realistic assumptions on the attacker’s capabilities is crucial
to effectively design a secure system [6]. Whereas weak attacker
models can underestimate the threats, a very strong attacker model
can lead to an overly complicated system design or require more
advanced hardware, which could hinder adoption [28]. We make
practical and realistic assumptions.
Research on wireless network security often uses a Dolev-Yao
attacker model [5], which assumes a very strong attacker, who is
able to control and manipulate all messages on the network. It is,
however, not necessarily realistic to assume that the attacker can
freely modify or annihilate the wireless signals at the receiver’s
antenna [28]. We therefore use a weaker but more realistic Dolev-
Yao attacker model, which is typically used when applying Integrity
Codes [3, 9, 36].
The main goal of the attacker (Mallory) is to impersonate Alice.
Mallory wants that Bob accepts her key instead of Alice’s key.
Mallory can eavesdrop all signals (passive). She can also send her own
signals (active), which superimpose with the legitimate signal at the
receiver’s antenna. Mallory’s signal transmissions are still bound
by the same physical signal propagation laws that also govern
legitimate transmissions, i.e., they arrive at the receiver after a
propagation delay with a phase shift. We assume that Mallory
can only operate outside the secure area S , which is controlled
and observed by Alice and Bob via proximity. We assume that she
cannot trivially disable the communication channel by shielding
A’s signals from propagating to B with a physical barrier.
Mallory may control any number N of devices
{
Mn : n ∈
{1, . . . ,N } }, which are placed anywhere outside the secure area
S . We denote as x(t) the signal that A transmits to B. We denote as
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mn (t) the signal that Mn transmits. These signals are affected by
the acoustic channel H , which attenuates and delays the signal. We
also consider additional noise v(t). Then, B receives the following
superposition of all these signals:
y(t) = HA→B {x(t)}︸          ︷︷          ︸
legitimate signal x ′(t )
+
N∑
n=1
HMn→B {mn (t)}︸               ︷︷               ︸
attackerm′n (t )
+ v(t)︸︷︷︸
noise
(1)
When designing our communication system, we account for signal
cancellation, bit flipping, and overshadowing attacks. We analyze
these types of attacks in section 5.
3.3 Secure Device Pairing Scheme
Alice uses her device A to transmit some public key material d to
Bob’s device B. The pairing process consists of the following steps:
(1) Alice initializes the pairing process on her device A. The
device now repeatedly broadcasts d on the acoustic channel
using AICs.
(2) Alice tells Bob that he can start receiving data now.
(3) Bob accepts the pairing process on his device B.
(4) Device B receives the key material over the acoustic channel.
(5) Device B notifies Bob that it received the key. The trans-
mission was either successful or there was an error due to
background noise or an attacker.
(6) Bob tells Alice that he finished the pairing process.
(7) Alice stops the transmission on her device A.
The SDP process is successful if there was no transmission error.
If the environmental noise is too high or if there is an attacker, the
transmission fails and they can try again at another location. We de-
sign AICs to provide message authentication of the communication
on the physical layer.
AICs require that the receiver is aware of an ongoing transmis-
sion. We could use additional signaling on the physical layer to
automate the manual steps (2), (3), (6) and (7), but this signaling
could be modified by the attacker. We cannot secure this signaling,
since we assume that we have no prior security context. We also
cannot use AICs to secure this signaling, since AICs require that
the receiver always knows that the legitimate transmitter is active.
3.4 Acoustic Integrity Codes
We now explain how we secure acoustic communication using the
AIC modulation scheme. This is the foundation of our SDP scheme.
AICs apply the concept of Integrity Codes [3] to acoustic signals.
We use Integrity Codes to defend against signal cancellation and
overshadowing attacks.
Figure 3 illustrates transmission and reception of AICs. The
transmitter A encodes the data using unidirectional error coding
(e.g., Manchester Coding) and frames the data by prepending a
delimiter header D[n] = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0). Čapkun et al. have shown
that this delimiter is optimal [3]. After framing,A converts the time
discrete sequence b[n] (consisting of repeated frames) into a time
continuous baseband signal s(t) using baseband OOK. As a result,
each bit b[n] corresponds to a time slot of durationTs during which
s(t) has a constant value of either 0 or 1. The signal’s gross bit rate,
including coding overhead and the delimiter, is Rд = 1/Ts . The net
bit rate Rn ≈ Rд/2 describes the effective number of bits that can
be transmitted per second.
Finally, A generates the bandpass signal x(t) in the frequency
band [flow, fhigh]. Instead of using a deterministic carrier signal, A
modulates a stochastic “carrier” signal w(t), sampled from a random
process {W (t)}. Unless otherwise noted, we use a white Gauss-
ian noise process {WWGN(t)}. This step differs from conventional
modulation schemes such as ASK, where s(t) is used to modulate
a deterministic carrier signal. This randomness is essential for in-
tegrity protection, as stochastic signals with low autocorrelation
cannot be cancelled out by an attacker (see section 5).
After modulation, A transmits the signal x(t) through the acous-
tic channel HA→B using a speaker:
x ′(t) = HA→B {x(t)} = αAx(t − τA) (2)
In our system model, we expect to have a strong line-of-sight (LOS)
component due to the devices’ proximity. Our approximate channel
model accounts for the attenuation αA and propagation delay τA
on the LOS path. The propagation delay is proportional to the
distance between the devices and satisfies the relation τA = AB/cs ,
where cs is the speed of sound in our transmission medium. The
transmission is also subject to additive noise v(t) resulting from
sound sources in the environment and from thermal noise in the
electrical components.
B records and receives the resulting signal y(t), as shown in
Equation 1. After filtering out background noise using a bandpass
filter, B performs synchronization to recover the frame boundaries
based on their delimiter and then demodulates this signal using
a decision function. In conventional modulation schemes such as
ASK, we would not consider an attacker at the physical layer and
therefore always decide on one of two possible states Sbinary =
{0, 1}, e.g., based on maximum likelihood. Such a decision function
Dbinary, however, is vulnerable to an overshadowing attack, which
we analyze in subsection 5.3. Instead, our decision function Dternary
considers an attacker at the physical layer and decides on one of
three possible states Sternary = {0, 1, ε}, where ε signals an error:
Dternary(p1,p2) =

0, if p1 < Pth and p2 > Pth
1, if p1 > Pth and p2 < Pth
ϵ, otherwise.
(3)
This decision function compares both slot powers of a Manchester
pair with a threshold Pth, which influences both the robustness
and security of AICs. We typically do not work with the absolute
detection threshold, but with the detection threshold relative to the
noise floor SNRth. Security-wise, it should be as low as possible.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we show how Acoustic Integrity Codes (AICs) and
our resulting Secure Device Pairing (SDP) scheme can be imple-
mented. We developed our system for two different platforms:
(1) An implementation in MATLAB for simulation and evalu-
ation.
(2) A proof-of-concept on Android smartphones for prac-
tical experiments, using the Kotlin programming language.
Figure 4 shows an overview of both implementations. We can
transmit and receiveAICs using either implementation. It is possible
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Data
푑 [푛]
푐 [푛]
푏 [푛]
푠 (푡)
푥 (푡)
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
1푇푠 5푇푠 6푇푠 7푇푠 8푇푠
푥 (푡)
2푇푠 4푇푠3푇푠
푑 = (1, 0, 1, 1)
푐 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0)
푏 = (
퐷︷        ︸︸        ︷
1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
푐︷             ︸︸             ︷
1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0,
퐷︷        ︸︸        ︷
1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
푐︷             ︸︸             ︷
1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . . )
Example: Transmission of data 0xb.
Alice frames the data using the delimiter 퐷 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0).
Below, we show the baseband modulated signal 푠 (푡) as the colored signal and the
bandpass modulated signal 푥 (푡) as the grey signal. For demonstration purposes, we
only plot the data part of a single frame.
For this example, Alice uses Manchester Coding, which performs the following map-
ping:
0→ 01
1→ 10
Received data
푟 (푡)
Demodulation
푦 (푡)
Reception Filter
푑ˆ [푛]
TX
RX
푟 (푡)
The channel attenuates the signal with dampening factor 훼퐴 and delays the signal with
propagation delay 휏퐴. There is also additional background noise 푣 (푡).
Bob determines the frame and slot boundaries based on the delimiter.
Alice transmits the signal 푥 (푡) using a speaker.
Bob receives the signal 푦 (푡) using a microphone. He uses a bandpass lter to remove
some background noise. The resulting signal is 푟 (푡).
Bob measures each slot’s power 푐ˆ푝 [푛]. He applies the decision function 퐷푡푒푟푛푎푟푦 to
demodulate the data 푑ˆ [푛] based on a threshold 푃푡ℎ .
푐ˆ푝 [푛]
푡
푡
푛1 5 6 7 82 43
1 0 11푑ˆ [푛],
푇푠
푠 (푡)
Unidirectional Error Coding
Framing
Baseband Modulation (OOK)
Bandpass Modulation (Noise)
Acoustic Channel
Clock Recovery
> < < < <> > >
Figure 3: Construction, transmission, reception, and decoding of AIC signals, including a complete example.
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to record the signals in the Android prototype into a WAV file and
analyze this using MATLAB.
4.1 Simulation
We use MATLAB version 9.4 R2018a to simulate AICs. Our implemen-
tation can generate, transmit, receive, and demodulate AIC signals
using the computer’s speaker and microphone. Alternatively, we
can also simulate a transmission using an additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel. We implement all steps shown in Figure 3.
Figure 5 shows the spectrogram of the signal y(t), which visual-
izes the power per frequency over time. In this example, the AIC sig-
nals’ energy is concentrated in the frequency band [16 kHz, 20 kHz]
with a SNR of 14 dB. We can clearly identify the three delimiters
(the wider rectangles at the beginning, middle, and end), and the
on and off slots in between.
4.2 Proof of Concept
Our proof-of-concept implementation runs on Android devices and
is available as open-source software [31]. We can receive and trans-
mit AIC signals, or we can record a WAV file for later analysis. We
use the Android software development kit (SDK) version 28 and
the Kotlin programming language version 1.3 [19] to write Android
applications. We generate Java 8 compatible bytecode, which the
Android SDK translates to Dalvik bytecode for use on the Android
runtime (ART) on Android devices. Our Android application re-
quires a minimum Android API level of 21, meaning that it supports
all devices with Android 5.0 (released in 2014) or higher. This is not
Matlab TX
Matlab RX
Android TX
Android RX
Channel
Simulation
Recording
Figure 4: Overview of MATLAB and Android implementa-
tions.
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Figure 5: Spectrogram of the AIC signal y(t). The frequency
resolution is 50Hz.
a limitation of our design, but allows for easier development of a
prototype by accessing more API features.
Our application consists of two components: (1) An Android
library that handles the modulation, transmission, demodulation,
and reception of AIC signals, and (2) an Android module for the user
interface, which imports the library. We generate AIC signals by
filling a sample buffer with Gaussian distributed random numbers
for each on slot and applying a bandpass filter. We transmit this
AIC signal using the Android API android.audio.AudioTrack
in streaming mode. For reception we use the audio processing
pipeline from TarsosDSP, which is a Java framework for real-time
audio analysis [37, 38]. Figure 6 shows the Android prototype’s
user interface.
We tested our implementation on various Android smartphones:
Huawei Nexus 6P (Android 8.1.0), LG G4 (Android 8.1.0), LG G5
(Android 7.1.2), LG Nexus 5 (Android 7.1), OnePlus 3T (Android
7.1.2), Samsung Galaxy S4 Mini (Android 9), Samsung Galaxy S6
(Android 7.1.2), Xiaomi Redmi K20 Pro (Android 10).
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze if regular Integrity Codes and AICs
satisfy our security goal of providingmessage authentication. A pas-
sive attack, where Mallory only eavesdrops on the communication
between A and B, does not impact this security goal. The adversary
can perform active attacks by sending signals, which B receives as
m′(t) = ∑nm′n (t) as part ofy(t) according to Equation 1. B requires
a high SNR to decode the signal:
SNR =
Psignal
Pnoise
=
∫ T
0 (x ′(t) +m′(t))2 dt∫ T
0 v(t)2 dt
. (4)
First, Mallory can try to disable communication between A and B
via stateless jamming, which reduces the SNR by increasing Pnoise.
(a) Transmission (b) Reception
Figure 6: Main views of the Android prototype.
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Second, Mallory can perform signal cancellation1 attacks, by send-
ing signals that destructively interfere with the legitimate signal
and, thus, preventing B from successfully decoding A’s signal. This
attack reduces the SNR by decreasing Psignal. A special case of this
attack is bit flipping, where Mallory also sends her own message
in addition to signal cancellation. Third, Mallory can perform over-
shadowing attacks by sending her signals with a power much higher
than A, so that in the superposition at B the decoding process will
be mostly influenced by Mallory.
We do not consider stateless jamming attacks, since protecting
the availability of our system is not our security goal. As our system
does not rely on the audibility of Mallory’s signals, it is also not
vulnerable to inaudible attacks [34, 40]. This leaves us with two dis-
tinct attack vectors on the message’s integrity: signal cancellation
and overshadowing.
5.1 Signal Cancellation Attacks
Integrity Codes rely on the assumption that signal cancellation
is not possible [3], i.e., that it is impossible to perform a bit flip
1 → 0 in a signal modulated using Integrity Codes. Under this
assumption, any other modification 0 → 1 can be detected via
unidirectional error coding, which protects the integrity of the
message. Signal cancellation attacks have recently gained interest
in the research community [8, 25, 28]. Figure 7 shows an exemplary
signal cancellation attack. Mallory uses deviceMSC (see adversary
model in Figure 2) to send a cancellation signal mSC (t), which
minimizes the power Psignal received at B:
Psignal =
1
T
∫ T
0
(
x ′(t) +m′SC (t)
)2 dt . (5)
Destructive interference means that two waves with opposite polar-
ity superimpose [33, pp. 212-213]. For sound pressure waves, this
is also known as active noise cancellation (ANC).
For the purpose of blocking communication by reducing the SNR
at the receiver, signal cancellation is more challenging to perform
compared to jamming, since it requires the attacker to both:
(1) predict her channel HMSC→B to B, and
(2) predict the signal x ′(t) from A at B’s microphone.
Mallory can then generate a signal mSC (t), which destructively
interferes and cancels A’s signal x ′(t). Practical signal cancella-
tion attacks have been demonstrated in lab environments [25, 28].
These attacks are challenging to perform and require precise syn-
chronization, especially when canceling high-frequency signals.
In the following security analysis, we assume a best case scenario
for the attacker, where she is able to completely predict all chan-
nels. We use the approximate channel model from section 3 with
constant attenuation α and group delay τ .
Mallory’s goal is to construct a cancellation signal
m′SC (t) = −x ′(t − τM ) (6)
with minimal cancellation delay τM , which requires predicting x ′(t).
Moser et al. demonstrated a practical signal cancellation attack on
predictable GPS signals in a lab environment [25]. Mallory, however,
cannot directly predict x ′(t) a priori without observing A’s signal
x(t), since x(t) is a stochastic signal.
1Signal cancellation is also known as signal annihilation.
We assume that Mallory can only indirectly predict x ′(t) a pos-
teriori using her received version xM (t) of x(t). She therefore uses
past values of xM (t) to predict future values of x ′(t). Pöpper et al.
demonstrated such a signal cancellation attack on QPSK signals in
a static lab environment [28]. They used two directional antennas
as relays (relaying attacker) and relayed A’s signal xM (t) to B.
We now formalize this attack. Mallory wants to relay the signal
xM (t) = HA→MSC {x(t)} = α1x(t − τ1). (7)
The channel HA→MSC delays the signal x(t) by τ1. When Mallory
relays this signal, the channel HMSC→B will delay it again by τ2.
She cannot invert these delays in real-time, since she does not have
access to future values of xM (t). She can only invert the attenuation
of these channels. She sends the signal
mSC (t) = − αA
α1α2
xM (t − τr ), (8)
where τr ≥ 0 s is an additional delay that she can freely adjust to
achieve better signal cancellation. B then receives
m′SC (t) = HMSC→B {mSC (t)} (9)
= −αA
α1
xM (t − τ2 − τr )
= −αAx(t − τ1 − τ2 − τr ).
We can rewrite this using Equation 2 as
m′SC (t) = −x ′(t + τA − τ1 − τ2 − τr ). (10)
For indirect prediction of x ′(t), the cancellation delay (according
to Equation 6) therefore is
τM = τ1 + τ2 + τr − τA . (11)
We now analyze whether a relay attack is possible against AIC
signals. Since we require Mallory to operate outside the safe area
S , we can give a lower bound for the cancellation delay due to the
propagation delay:
τM = τr +
AMSCB −AB
cs
≥ 2r −AB
cs
(12)
where cs is the speed of sound in the transmission medium. The
cancellation delay τM increases for larger safe area radii r and
for smaller AB. For example, Mallory can achieve τM > 1ms for
realistic parameters r > 40 cm > AB. The sound wave’s speed is
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Figure 7: Adversarial deviceMSC performing a signal cancel-
lation attack.
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an inherent physical-layer limitation that passively assists us with
authentication. A related strategy is distance bounding [2], which
actively measures the propagation delay and therefore requires
more sophisticated implementations.
We measure the effect of this attack using the resulting power
Psiдnal =
1
T
∫ T
0
(
x ′(t) − x ′(t − τM )
)2 dt (13)
= 2Px ′ − 2 1
T
∫ T
0
x ′(t)x ′(t − τM ) dt .
Note that without any cancellation delay (τM = 0), Mallory would
be able to completely cancel the signal x ′(t). Otherwise, Mallory
has tomaximize the subtrahend, which contains the autocorrelation
of the signal x ′(t):
Rx ′x ′(τM ) =
∫
x ′(t)x ′(t − τM ) dt . (14)
This is related to the autocorrelation of the original signal x(t):
Rx ′x ′(τM ) = α2A
∫
x(t − τA)x(t − τA − τM ) dt = α2ARxx (τM ).
(15)
To defend against relay attacks, we therefore have to construct
AIC signals with low autocorrelation Rxx (τM ) ≈ 0 for τM > 1ms.
The on slots in AIC signals consist of a stochastic “carrier” signal
w(t), which we generate by sampling from the stochastic process
{W (t)}. We implement AICs using Gaussian distributed signals
{WWGN (t)} for the on slots, which is optimal because white gauss-
ian noise has minimal autocorrelation [30, p. 189].
To simplify the implementation, most publications on Integrity
Codes use an existing modulation scheme with random symbols
as the on slots: FSK [3], QPSK [15], or OFDM in combination with
QAM [3, 9, 26]. This simplifies the implementation because parts of
an existing physical-layer pipeline, such as a Wi-Fi chip or an SDR
reference implementation, can be reused. It is a security tradeoff,
though, since these modulation schemes usually have high auto-
correlation, depending on the slot size TS , which in turn is prone
to signal cancellation.
5.2 Evaluation of Signal Cancellation Attacks
We compare two choices of {W (t)} using MATLAB simulations:
(1) On slots containing QPSK signals, which have high autocor-
relation. Most other implementations of Integrity Codes use
an existing modulation scheme such as QPSK.
(2) On slots containing Gaussian distributed signals, which have
low autocorrelation. This corresponds to our implementation
of AICs.
For both cases, we measure the autocorrelation coefficient and
the attenuation that a signal cancellation attacker achieves for
different cancellation delays τM . Our evaluation applies to different
device distancesAB and attacker locations according to Equation 12.
Mallory aims to achieve high attenuation to cancel Alice’s signal.
We do not vary the SNR, because we assume a best-case scenario
for Mallory where she is able to match Alice’s SNR. We use the
frequency band [200Hz, 800Hz] to better visualize the security
impact. For higher frequencies, signal cancellation is even more
challenging due to stricter timing constraints.
5.2.1 QPSK On Slots. Figure 8a shows an example of an AIC sig-
nal x(t) using the random process {WQPSK (t)}, which is a non-
stationary randomprocess containing randomQPSK symbols (drawn
independently with uniform probability). For this example, each
QPSK symbol has duration TQ = TS4 , such that each slot contains
four QPSK symbols. This use of “minislots” increases the secu-
rity [3], by reducing the autocorrelation. We use a gross bit rate
Rд ≈ 21.8 bps and a carrier frequency fc = 500Hz.
Even though the content of each on slot is “random” in the sense
that it consists of four QPSK symbols, where each symbol was
independently drawn from one of four possible QPSK symbols,
it is still deterministic during each of these QPSK symbols. The
underlying period fc of the deterministic carrier signal can be
clearly seen. Each QPSK symbol only carries two bits of information.
Figure 9a shows the attenuation that Mallory achieves for differ-
ent time delays using a relay attack. Destructive interference occurs
at multiples of the carrier period 1fc = 2ms, which is possible even
for realistic values of τM > 1ms (dashed line). For most time delays
and for high bit rates, however, the signals interfere constructively
and the attenuation is < 0 dB. Mallory therefore has to precisely
control her additional delay τr in Equation 11.
Figure 9b shows the autocorrelation Rxx (τM ) of an AIC signal
using {WQPSK (t)}. The autocorrelation has the same peaks as the
attenuation in Figure 9a, at multiples of the carrier period 1fc =
2ms. This is consistent with our argument that signal cancellation
requires high autocorrelation.
5.2.2 Gaussian On Slots. Figure 8b shows an example of an AIC
signal x(t) using a white Gaussian noise process {WWGN (t)}. Com-
pared to the QPSK-shaped on slots, the Gaussian-shaped on slots
carry more information and are therefore harder to predict. We
cannot determine any obvious patterns when looking at the plot.
Figure 10a shows the attenuation that Mallory achieves for differ-
ent time delays using a relay attack. The attenuation is positive only
for τM ≈ 0, where Mallory can successfully cancel the AIC signal.
Figure 10b shows the corresponding autocorrelation Rxx (τM ) of
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Figure 8: Four slots of an AIC signal using different on slot
implementations.
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the AIC signal. The autocorrelation coefficient is approximately
zero for τM > 1.5ms. When using a higher frequency band, such as
[16 kHz, 20 kHz], Mallory needs to achieve even lower cancellation
delays τM ≪ 1ms. As this is not possible for realistic safe areas,
Mallory’s cancellation signal actually increases the received power.
5.3 Overshadowing Attacks
In overshadowing attacks, Mallory attempts to send her own AIC
signal mO (t) (see Figure 2) with much greater power than the
legitimate signal x(t), so that her signalmO (t) determines the data
that B decodes. In contrast to signal cancellation attacks, Mallory
does not necessarily need to receive the legitimate signal. She could
use it, however, to obtain timing information and synchronize with
the legitimate signal.
We defend against overshadowing attacks by adjusting the re-
ceiver’s detection step. The receiver measures the power cˆp [n] of
every slot and applies a decision function D : R × R 7→ S on every
Manchester pair to determine the bit dˆ[n] that this pair encodes:
dˆ[n] = D (cˆp [2n], cˆp [2n + 1]) . (16)
Overshadowing attacks result in high slot powers in both slots,
which our decision function Dternary (see Equation 3) detects due
to the threshold Pth. The threshold should be as low as possible but
definitely lower than Alice’s average signal power. If an overshad-
owing attacker attempts a bit flip, her off slot overlaps with the
legitimate on slot, which has higher power than Pth. For conven-
tional modulation schemes such as ASK, however, existing decoders
do not consider an attacker at the physical layer and instead aim
at maximizing robustness to increase throughput. These binary
decision functions Dbinary decode the Manchester encoded slots
based on a relative comparison between the slot powers, which is
vulnerable to overshadowing attacks.
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Figure 9: Attenuation and Autocorrelation of an AIC signal
using {WQPSK (t)}.
Table 1: Comparison of Dbinary and Dternary in the presence
of an overshadowing attacker transmittingdM instead of the
legitimate d . The highlighted rows indicate attempted bit
flips.
d dM p1/dBFS p2/dBFS Dbinary(p1,p2) Dternary(p1,p2)
0 - -90 -70 0 0
0 0 -90 -59.6 0 0
0 1 -60 -70 1 ϵ
1 - -70 -90 1 1
1 1 -59.6 -90 1 1
1 0 -70 -60 0 ϵ
5.4 Evaluation of Overshadowing Attacks
We consider an overshadowing attacker in an exemplary scenario
with a noise floor of −90 dBFS, an SNR of 20 dB for the legitimate
sender, a higher SNR of 30 dB for the overshadowing attacker, and a
threshold of −80 dBFS at the receiver. Table 1 lists all combinations
of legitimate message bit d and adversarial message bit dM . The
receiver can detect bit flips (highlighted rows) using the secure
decision function Dternary, while Dbinary is vulnerable.
6 ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION
In the last section, we considered an active adversary attacking our
system. We now evaluate the robustness of AICs when there is no
active attacker. In this case, we have to deal with background noise
on the acoustic channel.
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Figure 10: Attenuation and Autocorrelation of an AIC signal
using {WWGN (t)}.
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6.1 Methodology
We use our MATLAB implementation to simulate AIC signals and
background noise. We vary the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the
receiver (see Equation 4), the gross bit rate Rд = 1Ts , the detection
threshold SNRth =
Pth
PNoise , and the bandwidth of our system. Our
evaluation results do not depend on the transmit power or the
device distanceAB, as these parameters both influence the resulting
SNR. We measure the resulting bit error ratio (BER).
All simulations use a sample rate of fs = 44.1 kHz. We simulate
additive white Gaussian noise with a noise power of −87 dBFS in
the frequency band. We transmit 128 bits of random data d . We
repeat all experiments 200 times and give the average result.
6.2 Inter-Symbol Interference
The bandwidth influences how fast the transitions between on slots
and off slots can happen. For low bandwidths, this transition takes
longer and the on slots’ energy spreads to the off slots, which is
called inter-symbol interference (ISI). We observe that both very low
and very high SNRs suffer from low bandwidth. This occurs for
different reasons:
• For low signal powers below the detection threshold, the
limited bandwidth further reduces the power in the on slots,
leading to detection difficulties at the receiver.
• For high signal powerswell above the detection threshold, the
limited bandwidth leads to increased power in the off slots
due to ISI. On slots and off slots are then above the detection
threshold, which is rejected by the decision function.
6.3 Results
We achieve low BERs below 1 % for Rд < 450 bps and SNR >
SNRth = 11 dB using bandwidths larger than 4 kHz. For a net bit
rate of 100 bps, e.g., we achieve a BER below 0.1 % at an SNR of
14 dB. This corresponds to a transmission time of approximately
1.2 s for a 128 bit hash value. The BER increases for higher bit
rates or lower bandwidths due to ISI. Using the insecure decision
functionDbinary improves robustness at the cost of being vulnerable
to overshadowing attacks (see subsection 5.3).
The detection threshold SNRth influences the robustness of our
pairing scheme using the ternary decision function Dternary. In Fig-
ure 11, we plot the BER for different SNRs and detection thresholds,
using the gross bit rate Rд = 220 bps. For a fixed SNR, the BER first
decreases to approximately 0 % and then increases again to 100 %:
• For SNRth ≈ 0 dB, ISI leads to bit errors because the on
slots’ energy spreads to the off slots, which both surpass the
detection threshold. This is why high SNRs, where the on
slots contain more energy, perform worse in the left half of
the plot.
• The increase in the right half of the plot is due to the de-
tection threshold surpassing the power of the on slots. This
occurs at ca. SNRth ≈ SNR + 3 dB (dashed lines), due to the
on slots having approximately twice the power than the
average signal power SNR.
The ISI in the plot’s left half decreases for lower bit rates. Our
results indicate that there is less tolerance on the detection threshold
for high bit rates and varying SNR values. For low bit rates, the
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Figure 11: BER for different detection thresholds SNRth and
SNRs.
range of detection thresholds that allow error-free transmission
increases.
7 CONCLUSION
SDP relies on an OOB channel to authenticate devices. We designed
an SDP scheme using short-range acoustic communication to trans-
mit key material. We proposed Acoustic Integrity Codes (AICs) to
achieve message authentication on the acoustic physical layer. To
the best of our knowledge, Integrity Codes have not been used to
secure acoustic communication before.
Integrity Codes can be vulnerable to signal cancellation attacks
if the transmitted on slots are not sufficiently random. Our secu-
rity analysis shows that we can defend against signal cancellation
attacks by designing signals with low autocorrelation, e.g., Gauss-
ian distributed signals. We introduced a set of realistic operation
parameters that mitigate signal cancellation attacks via additional
propagation delays: Compared to conventional modulation schemes
that do not consider an attacker at the physical layer, our system
can also detect overshadowing attacks by using a threshold in the
receiver’s decision function. The attacker cannot impersonate the
legitimate sender.
The robustness of AICs depends on the channel conditions and
the desired bit rate. Our evaluation demonstrated that lower bit
rates, higher signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs), and higher bandwidths
improve the bit error rate. Finally, we implemented a proof-of-
concept for Android devices to demonstrate practical pairing be-
tween different smartphone models.
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